Shared analysis

Sale wins on liquidity — refinance leaves cash on the table at best, and requires new equity at worst.

Scenario	Gross Proceeds/Funding	Less Debt Payoff	Less Transaction Cost	Net Cash to/(from) Owner	Cash-Out or Cash-In
Sale	$23,900,0001	($18,558,526)	($179,250)	$5,162,224	Cash-Out
CMBS (Base)	$18,040,0001	($18,558,526)	$0	($518,526)	Cash-In Required
CMBS (Rate Buydown)	$19,170,0001	($18,558,526)	($383,400)	$228,074	Cash-Out
Debt Fund	$18,710,0001	($18,558,526)	$0	$151,474	Cash-Out

The sale nets $5.16M in cash — $23.9M price, less the $18,558,526 payoff, less $179,250 brokerage (0.75%) . Nothing else comes close on near-term liquidity, since that's your stated objective.

Neither refinance option generates real liquidity, and one requires you to write a check:

CMBS (base, 5yr fixed, full-term IO at 6.79%): loan proceeds of $18,040,000 don't even cover the $18,558,526 payoff — you'd need to bring $518,526 of new equity to close . Proceeds here are DSCR-constrained (1.20x IO minimum), not LTV-constrained, so this shortfall isn't fixable by pushing leverage — it's a function of in-place NOI.
CMBS with rate buydown: paying $383,400 upfront to buy the coupon down to 6.39% lifts gross funding to $19,170,000, netting $18,786,600 — that flips the CMBS option to a $228,074 cash-out . Marginal liquidity gain, and you're paying real dollars today for a rate that only matters if you're holding the loan a while.
Debt Fund (floating, SOFR + 2.75%, 6.40% all-in, 2yr IO within a 3+1+1 term): $18,710,000 in proceeds nets a $151,474 cash-out — the only refinance path that returns cash without a buydown, though less than CMBS-with-buydown. Proceeds here are LTV-constrained (70% max), not DSCR — the loan is undersized relative to what NOI could theoretically support (actual DSCR 1.16x vs. a 1.00x IO minimum), so there's slack if the lender flexes on leverage.

Since you have no structural preference, the liquidity math should decide it: CMBS-with-buydown edges out the Debt Fund by ~$77K in cash-out, but that's a rounding error next to the risk and rate profile differences:

Rate risk: the Debt Fund is floating (Term SOFR + 2.75%); every 100bp of SOFR movement changes debt service by roughly $187,000/year on $18.7M. CMBS is fixed for the full 5-year term — no exposure.
Cash management: the Debt Fund requires a springing lockbox — an operational constraint CMBS doesn't carry, and one lenders trigger off performance covenants, not just default.
Term structure: the Debt Fund's 3+1+1 structure means you're back at the table for extension decisions in year 3 and year 4; CMBS is a clean 5-year hold with no extension mechanics.
Prepayment: CMBS carries yield maintenance with a 90-day open window before maturity — expensive to exit early. The Debt Fund's minimum-interest prepay is materially softer, which actually cuts the other way if you think you might sell or refi again inside 3 years.
Reserves: both carry the same $54,900 ($300/unit) replacement reserve forward-funded at closing, subject to PCA true-up — JLL flags PCA determinations for assets this age (built 1961) typically run $350–400/unit, so expect the reserve requirement to move up before closing, on either structure.
Execution risk: both are "subject to formal approval" with quotes not locked until day of closing ; the Debt Fund's floating quote is more exposed to market movement between now and closing than the fixed CMBS coupon.

Bottom line for a liquidity-first mandate: the sale is the only path that actually frees $5.16M. If you refinance instead, CMBS-with-buydown and the Debt Fund both leave you roughly flat to slightly cash-positive at closing — call it a wash on day-one dollars — so the decision comes down to whether you want fixed-rate certainty and a clean 5-year hold (CMBS) or a smaller cash-out with floating-rate exposure and a lockbox (Debt Fund). Neither refinance option is a liquidity event; both are closer to "keep the asset and touch up the capital stack."