Menlo Underwriting Agent

Amber Pines at Fosters Ridge underwrites to a 13.9% F&C IRR and 23.9% levered IRR at your $24.0MM basis — but the going-in cap rate of 6.1% sits inside the acceptable band only because trailing occupancy is soft and rents are still catching up from a 2024–25 dip.

Metric	Value
Deal Basis
Purchase Price	$24,000,000
Price/Unit	$193,548
Price/SF	$123.20
Loan Amount (65% LTV)	$15,600,000
Acquisition Fee (2.0%)	$480,000
Trailing 12 (Datamart)
Gross Potential Rent	$2,996,4391
Effective Gross Income (EGI)	$3,287,0721
Total OpEx	$1,823,9371
NOI	$1,463,1341
Going-in Cap Rate	6.10%1
Year 1 Pro Forma
Effective Gross Income (EGI)	$2,793,9061
NOI	$1,960,2251
Returns
Free & Clear IRR	13.85%
Free & Clear Equity Multiple	1.95x
Levered IRR	23.89%
Levered Equity Multiple	2.99x
Exit
Hold Period	7 years
Exit Cap Rate	5.75%
Residual Gross Value (Per Unit)	$2,433,552
Debt
Type	SOFR Swap
Term	7 yrs
Amortization	30 yrs
Interest-Only Period	24 months
Spread	130 bps
Index (SOFR)	3.66%

A few things worth flagging before you run with these numbers:

Occupancy is the swing factor. Trailing 30-day occupancy is 94.96% but spot occupancy just printed 86.29% — down 11.3% over the trailing 3 months. The forecasting engine's occupancy read for The Woodlands submarket came back low confidence with a "cyclical drawdown suspected" flag: the trailing trend is negative and the engine held occupancy flat at 92% rather than extrapolate the correction. I set Year 1/Year 2 occupancy to 94.0%/93.5% (splitting the difference between trailing-30-day and the T3 dip) — confirm this against your own diligence rather than treating it as engine output.

Market rent growth pre-fill is also low-confidence. The Woodlands submarket in-place rent history only spans ~25 months (all inside one post-2020 regime), so the engine flagged "boom extrapolation suspected" and capped confidence at low. I used 2.1% as the UEA market rent growth input (Sensitivity Analysis!B61) — the engine's Year 1 read was 1.6%, ramping to 2.6% by Year 7; 2.1% is a rough blend, not an engine output. Worth sharpening with your own submarket read before this goes to committee.

Exit cap rate (5.75%) equals your going-in cap (6.10%) minus roughly 35 bps of compression — inside the advisory tolerance (agent flags >100bps compression as aggressive), so no flag there.

Two pre-existing template defects, not something I introduced:

Property Returns!P13/AA13 and Charts!AC77 still hardcode the source deal's price as a literal in the sensitivity grids rather than deriving from D7 — a known quirk called out in the field guide, left alone per instruction.
RET!E15 contains a literal =#VALUE! placeholder from the source template (a base-year tax figure the original author never filled in), which cascades into a few RET growth-rate cells and the Venture equity-capacity block (Venture!B6:B24, fund-level pools not specific to this deal). None of this touches the NOI, IRR, or debt-sizing path — all validation blockers (NOI > 0, OpEx < income, occupancy and LTV in range) pass clean.

Not yet populated: OpEx Comps and RR Analysis (loss-to-lease) — these are supporting judgment tools per the field guide, not required for initial population. Also didn't touch the DD Tracker per instruction. Happy to run comps and a loss-to-lease build if you want the full picture before this goes out.

Let me know if you want me to build out the OpEx Comps benchmarking or the RR Analysis loss-to-lease schedule next — both would sharpen the rent growth and expense assumptions I flagged above as low-confidence.